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THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EDWARD G. MASCOLO*
S tanding at the "core" of the fourth amendment' is the security
of the individual's "privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice."2 To implement this principle, the Supreme Court has mandated
that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions. ' 3 These exceptions have been "jealously and
carefully drawn," 4 and the burden rests with those seeking exemption
from the general rule requiring the authority of a warrant to prove
that "the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."5
Among these exceptions6 is the "emergency" doctrine, which en-
compasses the doctrine of "hot pursuit."7 Although the emergency
* Member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief of the
Connecticut Bar Journal. B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown Univer-
sity, 1952.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
3. Katz, v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); accord, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
4. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
5. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); accord, Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971); see Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). It has been expressly recognized that the burden of establishing
an emergency exception rests with the prosecution. E.g., Root v. Gauper, supra; People
v. Smith, 17 Cal. 3d 282, 285, 287, 496 P.2d 1261, 1262, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893, 894, 896
(1972).
6. A summary is contained in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970), and
United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 1972).
7. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). For a representative
example of "hot pursuit," see id.; for a somewhat modified example, see United States
v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1972).
The doctrine of emergency is not to be confused with the preconditions of identity
and announcement of purpose generally required before the police may lawfully enter
a residence to conduct a search and seizure. In the latter case, the police usually are
not responding to a preexistent emergency but have come upon the premises with a
predetermined intent to effect an arrest or to conduct a search. See Ker v. California,
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exception has never been definitively explained by the Supreme Court,
it has been consistently recognized and applied by the lower courts to
a myriad of factual situations.8
In the context of this study, attention shall be focused primarily
upon those situations dealing with a police officer's response to an
emergency involving either the elements of saving life and/or pre-
serving property, rendering first aid, or conducting a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime, 9 during which he discovers evidence of an
incriminating nature. In some instances, the continuing emergency
will justify seizure; in others, the termination of the emergency will
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); United States v.
Wylie, 462 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Un-
lawful Entry: Miller v. U.S. and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 499 (1964);
Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, an Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44
ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 626 (1970); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J.
139 (1970). But see United States v. McShane, 462 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Gir. 1972), where
the court endorsed an exception to identity and purpose where the announcement
would place the officers in a position of "palpable peril." Recent legislation has broadened
the application of no-knock entries in the execution of search warrants. E.g., Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 880(b) (1970);
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODY
ANN. § 23-521 to -522 (1970). The rationale for the requirements of identity and an-
nouncement of purpose is to afford the occupants of premises to which entry is sought
an opportunity to voluntarily surrender their privacy. This purpose is primary and takes
legal precedence over any incidental opportunity to destroy or secrete evidence that
may be accorded the occupants. Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289
A.2d 119 (1972).
Finally, the emergency exception, excluding application to "hot pursuit," is to be
distinguished from the right of the police to enter a home to effect a warrantless arrest,
The obvious distinction lies in the realm of the officer's intent: in response to an emer-
gency, the officer desires to save life and/or preserve property, to render first aid, to
conduct a general inquiry into an unsolved crime. See United States v. Goldenstein, 456
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971).
To seek an arrest, however, the officer intends to engage in specific search-and-seizure
activity under the fourth amendment. Entry to effect a warrantless arrest and the
emergency exception will overlap when the latter exists at or before the moment of
entry. In this event, the emergency will sanction prompt and immediate access to the
home, thereby qualifying the arrest under the emergency exception and not under some
general exemption for arrests. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393-94
(D.C. Cir. 1970). For authorities seriously questioning the right of the police to enter
a home to effect a warrantless arrest in the absence of an emergency, see Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-81 (1971); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
499-500 (1958); Dorman v. United States, supra at 390-91.
8. On occasion, it has been given a limited construction, one strictly tailored to
the factual situation to which it was applied. E.g., Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364
(8th Cir. 1971).
9. This type of inquiry is limited to that period prior to the point that the in-
vestigation begins to focus on a particular suspect, who is subsequently arrested. See
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). As an example of such an inquiry
apropos the emergency doctrine see United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010
(8th Cir. 1972).
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render the subsequent search and seizure unreasonable. Thus, for a
seizure to be legitimate under the emergency doctrine, it must be rele-
vant to the officer's presence. Closely allied to this is the inadvertent
nature of the discovery, for the requirement of inadvertence has taken
on added significance with the recent refinement of the doctrine of
intrusive "plain view." In short, at the moment of intrusion the officer
must not enter with "an accompanying intent to search unlawfully."10
I. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, INCIDENTAL SEARCH, AND THE
DOCTRINE OF INADVERTENT "PLAIN VIEW"
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,1 a plurality of the Supreme Court
articulated a principle qualifying the application of the plain view doc-
trine' 2 after law enforcement officers intrude upon the individual's
constitutionally protected zone of privacy:' 3
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
10. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1014 (8th Cir. 1972) (Stephenson,
J., dissenting).
11. 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The opinion, delivered by Justice Stewart, was joined
by three justices. Justice Harlan concurred only in the judgment reversing petitioner's
conviction for murder. However, one court has interpreted the position of the plurality
as being "constitutionally persuasive." E.g., Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 586 n.1,
292 A.2d 762, 763 n.1 (1972).
12. Simply stated, the doctrine holds that what is open to view is not an object
of search "and therefore not within the purview of the Fourth Amendment." United
States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230, 233 n.3 (5th Cir. 1971). This definition is qualified,
however, by the requirement that the observer must be lawfully positioned to have
that view. E.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); United States v.
Cecil, 457 F.2d 1178, 1180 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649,
653 (7th Cir. 1971). Obviously, the doctrine will not extend to hidden or concealed
objects. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972); People
v. Conley, 21 Cal. App. 3d 894, 901, 98 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873-74 (4th Dist. 1971).
13. The exceptions to the requirement of a warrant permit access by law en-
forcement officers to an area in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of
freedom from governmental intrusion. In assessing whether a particular expectation of
privacy is constitutionally justified, it is proper for a court to consider the individual's
proprietary or possessory interest in the area. See United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231,
1239 (5th Cir. 1972); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584 611-12, 292 A.2d 762, 778
(1972). This is done not to exalt property over personal rights, for the thrust of the fourth
amendment is directed toward the preservation of the individual's privacy. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967) ; Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401,
406 (5th Cir. 1969). Rather, it is a point of reference in measuring the degree of
protection afforded by the amendment. Katz v. United States, supra at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring); see Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 226-28 (1972); Note,
From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. R.v. 968, 983-84 (1968); 55 MINN. L. Rav. 1255, 1263 (1971).
421
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the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure.14
Thus, the plurality limited the doctrine to situations of prior justifica-
tion for intrusion in the course of which incriminating evidence is in-
advertently discovered, and rendered it inapplicable to circumstances
"where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance
the location of the evidence and intend to seize it."15 The effect of this
qualification, then, was to require the police to obtain a search war-
rant if, prior to entry, they anticipated discovery and seizure of an
object lying beyond the scope of a valid incidental search. 6 To hold
otherwise would invite the police to invoke the doctrine to justify a
general search, and would permit an initially valid and limited search
to degenerate into an exploratory quest for evidence of guilt or of
crime.17
The supporting thesis for the plurality opinion in Coolidge was
that plain view should not be invoked to extend the scope of inci-
dental search permitted under Chimel v. California.8 To accomplish
14. 403 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 470. An inadvertent view or observation has been characterized also
as "seeing through eyes that are neither accusatory nor criminally investigatory." Marshall
v. United States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970). For example, if a law enforce-
ment officer enters upon private premises solely to execute a search warrant and peers
into a home through an opening in partially closed draperies, his viewing will not be
considered inadvertent. United States v. Esters, 336 F. Supp. 214, 221 (E.D. Mich.
1972).
16. 403 U.S. at 484. However, this restriction will not pertain to the seizure of
anticipated evidence discovered during the course of a properly limited incidental search.
Id. at 482. The only instance where plain view is permitted to extend the scope of
incidental search is when the arresting officer, during the course of "an appropriately
limited search" of the arrestee, inadvertently views a piece of evidence lying "outside
of the area under the immediate control of the arrestee." Id. at 465-66 n.24. The
vantage point, however, must lie within the area "of an appropriately limited search."
Id.; accord, Neam v. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 183, 286 A.2d 540, 543 (1972). Coolidge
has been interpreted to mean that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless search
on probable cause, but not incident to a lawful arrest, is unreasonable. State v. Ponce,
16 Ariz. App. 122, 125, 491 P.2d 845, 848 (1971).
17. 403 U.S. at 467, 469-71.
18. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel the Court restricted the scope of incidental
searches to "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-con-
struing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence." Id. at 763. In short, the scope was constricted to
the person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate reach.
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this, the opinion was obliged to graft upon plain view the additional
restriction of "inadvertence."' 19 Thus, the Coolidge plurality found an
ifitimate link between plain view and the search-incident exception-
one that could not be divorced without effectively undermining
Chimel.20 Therefore, Coolidge and Chimel are to be read as limita-
tions upon the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Although the opinion directed itself to an analysis of the doctrine
of plain view, the position adopted by the plurality actually amounted
to the forging of a new doctrine-one that more appropriately should
be designated as "intrusive plain view," to distinguish it and its
preconditions from the more traditional setting in which internal evi-
dence is openly viewed from an external vantage point-a situation that
might be designated accurately as "non-intrusive plain view." 21 The
distinguishing, and therefore limiting, characteristics of intrusive plain
view are twofold: first, the intrusion, or official presence, must be
constitutionally justified; and, second, the discovery must be inad-
vertent.22 Thus, while the doctrine of intrusion has no application to
19. 403 U.S. at 465 n.24, 466, 469-71. For endorsement of the inadvertence
refinement of plain view, see Landynski, The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amend-
ment Standards: The Extraordinary Case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 45 CONN.
B.J. 330, 353 (1971).
20. 403 U.S. at 482. For a penetrating analysis of the historical growth of plain
view from an adjunct to the search incident exception to an autonomous exception in
its own right, see Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 587-609, 292 A.2d 762, 764-76
(1972).
21. It has been argued that to treat both situations as plain view will lead to
"[n]eedless confusion," because the rule fashioned in Coolidge required a vantage point
"within a constitutionally protected area," whereas nonintrusive plain view imposed
no such requirement. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to refer to the Coolidge
refinement as "plain view," and to designate external viewing as either "'clearly
visible,' 'readily observable,' [or] 'open to public gaze.'" Scales v. State, 13 Md. App.
474, 478 n.1, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n.1, (1971).
Although the court in Scales was correct in reasoning that intrusive and nonintrusive
plain view dealt with "two visually similar but legally distinct situations," id., it should
be recognized that in both the observer lawfully obtained his vantage point. In short, the
requirement of lawful presence will not be restricted to presence within, as distinguished
from without, premises searched. For example, no one could question seriously the reason-
ableness of an observation, inadvertent or planned, made from a public area into a
private residence or a motor vehicle through an unsecured window. E.g., United States
v. Story, 463 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230, 232
(5th Cir. 1971); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1969); Edwards v.
State, 38 Wis. 2d 332, 337-38, 340, 156 N.W.2d 397, 401, 402 (1968). In such a
situation, it would be unrealistic to argue that a justifiable expectation of privacy had
been violated. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For further dis-
cussion of the distinctions between intrusive and nonintrusive plain view, see Brown
v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 606-07, 292 A.2d 762, 774-75, (1972).
22. 403 U.S. at 466, 467, 469; United States v. Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179, 183
(E.D. Mich. 1972); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 602-09, 292 A.2d 773-76 (1972).
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nonintrusive situations where the observations made require no prior
constitutional justification for entry and presence, it complements a
prior justifiable intrusion by "articulating the rationale of the
justification. '23
Although it is difficult to predict the ultimate influence of
Coolidge on the law of search and seizure,24 its impact upon the emer-
In the case of nonintrusive plain view, neither condition pertains. The only requirement
is that the vantage point be legally accessible to the officer. Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234, 236 (1968). It is somewhat confusing whether the opinion attached a third
condition to the doctrine, for at one point it commented that "plain view does not
occur until a search is in progress," 403 U.S. at 467. However, it had previously noted
that "the 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an in-
criminating object." Id. at 466. This seeming contradiction is probably explicable in
terms of the plurality's desire to forge a doctrine as a barrier to the situation in which
an initially limited search expands into a "general exploratory search from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges." Id.
23. Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 474, 478 n.1, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n.1 (1971).
24. Unfortunately, the plurality's treatment of plain view is not without am-
biguity. Although the opinion condemned the planned warrantless seizure of anticipated
evidence open to internal view, it is not altogether clear whether the proscription will
extend to objects that are either contraband, stolen, or dangerous in themselves. This
is because the plurality appeared to emphasize the fact that the evidence seized was
neither contraband, stolen, nor dangerous. 403 U.S. at 471-72 n.28. Thus, Coolidge has
been interpreted as exempting such objects from its ban. E.g., People v. Medina, 26 Cal.
App. 3d 809, 818, 103 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343 (1972): Fixel v. State, 256 So. 2d 27, 29
(Fla. Ct. App., 3d Dist. 1971). For an apparently contrary interpretation, at least by
implication, see United States v. Esters, 336 F. Supp. 214, 221, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
It is submitted that Coolidge should not be given a restrictive interpretation which
will rigorously exempt contraband, stolen goods, and dangerous articles from its ban
on planned warrantless seizure, and that such exemption should apply only when there
is a clear threat of destruction or removal of evidence. In the first place, such a blanket
exemption would conflict with the rule announced in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967), explicitly abolishing any fourth amendment distinction between contra-
band, stolen goods, or dangerous articles, and "mere evidence," a fact which the plurality
acknowledged. 403 U.S. at 464. Thus, the quality of evidence seized is not determinative
of its suppression. Secondly, in postulating its refinement of plain view, the plurality
reaffirmed the Court's repeated condemnation of entry to effect a warrantless seizure
of contraband. Id. at 468. Furthermore, this rejection has extended even to entry on
probable cause. E.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). Finally, in
articulating a nexus between plain view and the search-incident exception, the plurality
was endeavoring to reaffirm the Court's preference for warrants without regard to the
quality of evidence seized. It is difficult to see how such a link can be effectively forged
by a blanket exemption of the very objects that represent the overwhelming examples
of warrantless seizures. In short, the nature of evidence is irrelevant to the rationale of
the Coolidge limitations upon plain view, which is that "any intrusion in the way of
search or seizure . . . should be as limited as possible" so as to guard against the
dreaded general search. 403 U.S. at 467 (emphasis in original). As one commentator
has noted, it is possible that the opinion was not attempting to carve out any excep-
tions for contraband, stolen goods, or dangerous articles, but rather was suggesting
that although all types of evidence are subject to seizure, a higher standard would
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gency exception, by severely limiting warrantless seizures under plain
view to those objects inadvertently discovered after lawful entry, should
prove to be rather substantial. The effect of this will be to restrict the
scope of official presence to the immediate area of the emergency and
to restrain peace officers from wandering about a home in anticipa-
tion of discovering evidence of crime. Thus, Coolidge should prove to
be a limitation upon the critical element of lawful presence, the
existence of which is an indispensable prerequisite of the emergency
doctrine exception.
II. THE EMERGENCY DOCTRINE EXCEPTION
Excluding the consent situation, which, because it "obviates the
need for a warrant, . . . is ... not a mere 'exception' to the warrant
requirement," 25 and "invariably present[s] no emergency,"26 every
exception to the requirement of a warrant derives from an emer-
gency. Thus, in the search-incident exception, the exigent circum-
stances justifying prompt action are harm to the arresting officer and
destruction of incriminating evidence within reach of the arrestee.27
Additionally, what lies at the core of the "hot pursuit," destruction-of,
and removal-of-evidence exceptions is the element of urgency requir-
ing, and even demanding, immediate responsive action by the police. 28
The focus of this article will be directed to a particular type of emer-
gency situation which has evolved as a specific exception to the warrant
requirement, one that is designated as the "emergency" exception.
apply to mere evidence if the prosecution invoked an exception to the warrant require-
ment. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 243 n.30 (1971).
Another issue left open in Coolidge was the right of law enforcement officers to in-
trude for the purpose of warrantless arrest. 403 U.S. at 481. In Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court ruled that absent compelling cir-
cumstances, an arrest warrant was required before the police could enter a dwelling to
effect an arrest. Id. at 390-91. Although the court did recognize a number of circum-
stances which would permit entry without a warrant, interestingly, only one of them
dealt with the nature of evidence that might be subject to seizure, namely, a weapon,
and no reference was made by the court to either contraband or stolen property. Id. at
392-93.
25. Landynski, supra note 19, at 353.
26. Mascolo, Inter-Spousal Consent to Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: A
Constitutional Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 351, 374 (1966).
27. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478 (1971); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
28. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
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Although it has been claimed" that the exception derives from a dictum
postulated by Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States,30 it has been
more accurately recognized that "[t]he right of the police to enterand
investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either
search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace
officers, and derives from the common law." 31
The doctrine of emergency in the law of search and seizure has
never been defined in terms of its overall concept. The usual practice
has been for a court to tailor its definition to the circumstances of
each case. 2 Within the context of this study, the doctrine may be de-
fined as follows: Law enforcement officers may enter private premises
without either an arrest or a search warrant to preserve life or prop-
erty, to render first aid and assistance, or to conduct a general in-
quiry into an unsolved crime, provided they have reasonable grounds
to believe that there is an urgent need for such assistance and protec-
tive action, or to promptly launch a criminal investigation involving
a substantial threat of imminent danger to either life, health, or
property, and provided, further, that they do not enter with an ac-
companying intent to either arrest or search. If, while on the premises,
they inadvertently discover incriminating evidence in plain view, or as
a result of some activity on their part that bears a material relevance
29. Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971).
30. 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for
effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended
that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with.
Id. at 14-15.
31. United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
1004 (1964) (emphasis added); see Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822); 1 J.
CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 18, 20 (3d Am. ed. 1836); see also Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant, 22 McH. L. REv. 541, 802-03 (1924). Thus, they would not be entering as
trespassers. See People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378-79, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956).
Although Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), overruled the trespass
doctrine announced in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928), this
does not mean that the presence of a trespass is without relevance to the issue of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment. See Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 95 n.3,
238 A.2d 147, 149, 150 n.3 (1968), where the court interpreted Katz as not overruling
the rule of suppression where evidence is obtained as the result of an unwarranted
physical intrusion into an area where the individual harbors a reasonable expectation
of privacy. This interpretation would appear to be correct because Katz, in exalting
privacy over property interests, emphasized that the absence of a physical intrusion would
not be determinative of the issue of reasonableness. 389 U.S. at 353; see United States
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312-13 (1972). It never argued that
the presence of such intrusion would be irrelevant.
32. E.g., Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971); Patrick v. State,
227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 1967).
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to the initial purpose for their entry, they may lawfully seize it with-
out a warrant.33 Thus, to qualify as- an emergency exception, there
must reasonably appear to exist an exigency in the course of which a
discovery related to the purpose of the entry is made. The exigent
circumstances legitimate the presence, and the relevance of the:'dis-
covery to the justification for the entry sanctions the seizure.
Since the doctrine permits warrantless access by the police to an
area in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion, it must be strictly construed so as to keep
such intrusion as limited as possible. 34 Therefore, in assessing the
reasonableness of the intrusion, a court should be guided by the ad-
33. See United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004
(1964); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., con-
curring) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d
374, 378-79, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del.
1967); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395-98, 204 A.2d 76, 80-81 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 966 (1965); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 260.5
(Official Draft No. 1, 1972); see also Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MIcr. L.
REv. 541, 802-03 (1924). As long as there is a reasonable basis for the belief, the entry
will be sustained, even if it develops that no emergency did exist. Wayne v. United
States, supra (Burger, J., concurring) (dictum); Patrick v. State, supra. Typical ex-
amples of its application are a shout or cry for help, related or unrelated to crime,
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); People v. Clark, 262 Cal. App.
2d 471, 473, 68 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (4th Dist. 1968); screams, United States v. Barone,
supra; violence, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); an "emergency" call
that an unconscious or semiconscious person is in need of aid, Wayne v. United States,
supra at 212-14; People v. Roberts, supra; Davis v. State, supra; the reporting of a
crime of violence promptly after its commission requiring the officer's presence tointer-
view a possible victim or bystander, United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010-11
(8th Cir. 1972).
Obviously, "hot pursuit," the observance of a crime from a lawful vantage point,
and the fact that evidence is being destroyed or removed, are examples of exigent
circumstances that usually will require prompt response from law enforcement officers.
E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied sub nom. Ponce v. California, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970); United States
v. Brewer, 343 'F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Hawaii 1972); State v. Krause, No. 6901
(Conn. Sup. Ct., May 11, 1972); Edwards v. State, 38 Wis. 2d 332, 337-38,
156 N.W.2d 397, 401-02 (1968). In these situations, however, the presence of the
officer is motivated solely by a desire to effect either a specific arrest or seizure. He is
not altruistically responding to an emergency that at most may have only tangential
relevance to the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth amend-
ment. Furthermore, it is highly questionable whether the observation of a possessory
crime, where there are no compelling circumstances requiring prompt action, is Per se
sufficient to justify entry to effect a warrantless arrest. In short, external observation
alone should not qualify under the emergency exception. See ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 260.5 (Official Draft No. 1, 1972).
34. See United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972)."
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monition that "the scope of the Fourth Amendment is not determined
by the subjective conclusion of the law enforcement officer."'a Since a
search warrant confers only a limited privilege upon police officers to
gain access to private premises,3 6 the courts must be vigilant to any at-
tempt to circumvent the requirement of a warrant by invoking one
of the exceptions so as to expand what otherwise would be only a
particularly conferred authority. Thus, mere inconvenience and delay
attendant upon the procurement of a warrant will not qualify as an
exigent circumstance under the emergency exception; 87 nor will law
enforcement officers be permitted to invoke the doctrine capriciously
to circumvent the warrant requirement so as to seize evidence they
anticipate discovering.3S In short, the privilege to enter to render aid
and assistance, or in response to some other exigency, will not justify
a search for an unrelated purpose.39
f These caveats aside, it must be recognized that the emergency doc-
trine serves an exceedingly useful purpose.' Without it, the police
would be helpless to' save life and property, and could lose valuable
time especially during the initial phase of a criminal investigation. The
effect would be a severe loss to society without any resultant increase
in protection to the individual. Chief Justice Burger has made a cogent
argument for the doctrine:
[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning
home to rescue occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting
or to bring emergency aid to an injured person. The need to protect
or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would
be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. Fires or dead
bodies are reported to police by cranks where no fires or bodies are
to be found. Acting in response to reports of "dead bodies," the police
may find the "bodies" to be common drunks, diabetics in shock, or
35. United States v. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis
added).
36, Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972).
37. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); see United States v. Brewer, 343 F. Supp. 468, 472-73
(D. Hawaii 1972). I
38. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 n.26, 471 n.27 (1971);
see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). This will be especially so
where a court attempts to justify the seizure of objects in plain view after an emergeflcy
entry,.E.g., Patrick v State, 227 A.2d 486, 489-90 (Del. 1967).
- 39. People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956); see Root
v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Harris v. United States, 331
U.S, 1,45, 153 (1947). This is but a corollary of the rule that precludes law enforce-
ment officers from resorting to an illegal arrest as a pretext for a general search, E.g.,
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
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distressed cardiac patients.' But the business of policemen and firemeri
is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether the report is correct:
People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm
deliberation associated with the judicial process. Even the apparently
dead often are saved by swift police response. A myriad of circum-
stances could fall within the terms "exigent circumstances" . . ., e.g.,
smoke coming out a window or under a door, the sound of gunfire in"
a house, threats from the inside to shoot through the door at police,.
reasonable grounds to believe an injured or seriously ill person is
being held within.
•... That such an entry would be an intrusion is undoubted but
here we reach the balancing of interests and needs. When policemen,
firemen or other public officers are confronted with evidence which'
would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act
to protect life or property, they are authorized to act [without a war-
rant] on that information, even if ultimately found erroneous.40
III. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
A frequent application of ihe doctrine has involved a situation
where peace officers are prompted to enter private premises for humari-
tarian reasons that initially are of only peripheral relevance to a crim-
inal investigation. In this type of situation, time is usually of the es-
sence. An example of this was presented in Davis v. State,41 where the
court held that a search warrant was not required when police officers,
called to investigate a death, discovered a brutally beaten corpse at the
rear of a house and observed inside the house the feet of another 'per-
son, but were unable without entry to determine whether the latter
was still alive.4 As the court reasoned:
Basichumanity required that the officers offer aid to the person within.
the house on the very distinct possibility that this person had suffered
at the hands of the perpetrator of the homicide discovered in the back i
yard. The delay which would necessarily have resulted 'from an ap-'-
plication for a search warrant might have been the'difference betweer
40. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205,. 212 (D.C. Cir,) (Burger, J., con-
curring) (dictum) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963-); accord,
People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721.(1956):
Necessity often justifies an action .... where the act is prompted by, the.,,
motive of preserving life or property and reasonabiy appears to the actor to be
necessary for that. purpose.-
Id. at 377, 303 P.2d at 723. - .
41. 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966 (1965)..-l
42. Id. at 395-96, 204 A.2d at 80-81.
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life and death for the person seen exhibiting no signs of life within
the house. The preservation of human life has been considered para-
mount to the constitutional demand of a search warrant as a condi-
tion precedent to the invasion of the privacy of a dwelling house.
40
Another example of the doctrine arises where the police respond
to an urgent call reporting violence and they enter both to investigate
a possible crime and to prevent further injury or to determine the
extent of such injury.44 Here, the critical factors dispensing with the
need for a warrant are the preservation of human life, which takes
precedence over the right of privacy, and the lack of an intent at the
moment of entry to engage in a search or seizure.45
Occasionally, the emergency doctrine will sanction the initial
entry but not subsequent activity.40 Thus, in United States v. Golden-
stein,47 the majority ruled that while the initial entry into defendant's
hotel room was justified under the doctrine, the officer's ensuing
search-and-seizure actions (after he had satisfied himself that defendant
was not present, thereby obviating the need for a prompt response to
thwart either an attack upon the officer or the destruction of evi-
dence), which uncovered hidden evidence of a crime unrelated to the
one which the officer was investigating s at the time of entry, could not
be justified under the doctrine.49 The opinion noted that the emer-
gency doctrine sanctioned warrantless entry and search for defendant,
as well as discovery of a bloody shirt in plain view, but once the officer
has satisfied himself that defendant was not present, the doctrine could
not support any further search activity. Furthermore, since the proceeds
of the robbery were concealed in a closed suitcase, plain view did not
43. Id. at 395, 204 A.2d at 80; accord, People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 377,
303 P.2d 721, 723 (1956); People v. Brooks, 4 I1. App. 3d 835, 841, 289 N.E.
2d 207, 213, (1972). The same result will apply to "loud screams in the dead of
night." United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
1004 (1964).
44. E.g., Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 1967); Maxey v. State, 251
Ind. 645, 650, 244 N.E.2d 650, 653-54 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 949 (1970).
45. Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 1967).
46. It is in this area that the Coolidge doctrine of intrusive plain view will have
the greatest impact upon the emergency exception.
47. 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972).
48. While looking for defendant in a hotel room in Portland, Oregon, to investigate
a guh battle in the hotel lobby, the officer uncovered part of the proceeds of a bank
robbdry that had taken place in St. Peters, Missouri. The officer had been informed
that defendant appeared to have been wounded in the fight, and that he had gone to
his room carrying a weapon. Upon arrival at the hotel, the officer found a victim of
the shooting lying on the floor.
49. Id. at 1010.
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apply.5o Therefore, under the circumstances presented; the right to
search under the emergency doctrine could not extend beyond the per-
missible scope of incidental search, and the room could have been
sealed off or posted to deny access to defendant while a warrant was
sought.5' Finally, since the officer did not possess, at the time of entry,
probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime, the
hot pursuit exception could not be invoked.52
The dissent argued that this was a classic example of the emer-
gency doctrine; that to have required the officer to vacate the room after
learning of defendant's absence for the purpose of seeking a warrant at
2 A.M. on Saturday, thereby giving defendant ample time to flee, fur-
ther. conceal his identity, 'and possibly shoot someone, would be un-
realistic; and that it was reasonable for the officer to have entered the
room, without an accompanying intent to search unlawfully, to search
for defendant and, after determining his absence, to have conducted a
thorough investigation of the room and its contents for the sole pur-
pose of learning defendant's identity, his current whereabouts, and the
presence of any weapons.53
The dissent took strongest exception to the majority's limiting the
scope of the emergency doctrine right to search to that permissible
under the search-incident exception, arguing that these two exceptions
are "separate and distinct. ' 54 Although conceding that the "contours"
of the emergency exception have not been refined and that the Su-
preme Court "has never pinned it down to a workable and effective
meaning," the dissent nevertheless felt that if the doctrine did not
pertain in the circumstances of this case, "it is difficult indeed to think
of a case in which it ever could be applied." 55
50. Id.
•51. Id.
52. Id. at 1011.
53. Id, at 1014 (dissenting opinion).
54. Id. For the proposition that the Chimel strictures apply only to incidental
searches, see State v. Toliver, 5 Wash. App. 321, 323, 487 P.2d 264, 267 (1971).
Although an attempt has been made to distinguish between "emergency" and "routine"
incidental searches, and to limit 'Chimel to the latter,' e.g., Simpson v. State, 486 S.W.
2d 807, 810 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1972), this position is untenable. There are no
types of incidental searches, and the Supreme Court has never expounded, let alone
hinted at, their existence. Regardless of the factual context of an arrest, the permissible
scope of incidental search is governed by the Chimel restrictions. This does not mean
that law enforcement officers may never-extend the scope of their search activities
beyond the area of incidental searches. To do so, however, they must invoke some other
exception to the warrant requirement, most typically, "hot pursuit" or one of its offshoots.
55. 456 F.2d at 1015 (dissenting opinion).
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As. thus presented, the majority in Goldenstein had premised its
ruling on the postulate that under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, the emergency doctrine exception could not be invoked to sanc-
tion a warrantless search beyond the permissible limits of the search-
incident exception. The dissent, however, had objected to this, arguing
that the Supreme Court had never attempted to equate the tWo ex-
ceptions, and that under the edict of the majority, the search of the
suitcase could have been sustained only if it had been located within
arm's reach of the defendant.5 6
Another situation to which the emergency exception pertains is
where peace officers enter in response to an urgent situation fraught
with, imminent danger of violence and discover evidence of an, un-
related crime. Here, the reasonableness of the seizure will hinge on the
relevance of the discovery to the purpose for the entry. Thus, if the
evidence is detected as a result of a search connected with the purpose
of the entry, and while the officers are responding to an emergency
56. The majority position in Goldenstein is sound, for the search and seizure
could not be sustained under the emergency doctrine. In the first place, the d'scovtery
and seizure were effected after the emergency had terminated and after the officer had
satisfied himself that defendant was not present. Secondly, as the majority recognized,
the officer did not have probable cause to believe that defendant had commtt&I a
crime. At most, he had a basis for interrogating defendant concerning the shooting
of the victim who had been in a fight with persons other than defendant. 456 F.2d at
1010-11. Therefore, there was no justification, as had existed in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967), for an extensive search for weapons and evidence of crime. 456 F.2d
at 1011. Finally, the evidence was not in plain view, and was not discovered in further-
,ance of the purpose justifying the initial entry. Id at 1010.
The majority was also correct in equating, "under the circumstances of this' case,"
the emergency and search-incident exceptions. The restrictions placed on the latter by
Chimel were done to guard against the dreaded general search. To the same effect
was the Court's refinement of plain view in Coolidge.' Since the officer in Goldenstein
had entered the room to render first aid and to conduct a possible interview concerning
an unsolved crime, he certainly had the right to conduct, as he in fact did, a thorough
search of the room, closet, and adjacent bathroom for defendant; and, if he had dis-
covered him and had obtained probable cause for an arrest, he would have been per-
mitted to conduct a limited incidental search under Chimel for weapons and evidence of
guilt. Furthermore, if this appropriately restricted search had uncovered evidence of
another unrelated crime, it would have been reasonable for him to effect its immediate
seizure. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). But if:a seatch
that is supported by a valid arrest of a present accused is not permitted to extend bbyond
his person and the area within his immediate reach, Chimel v. California, 395 U,S, 752,
'763 (1969), it is difficult to see how a warrantless search beyond such limits can be
sanctioned when the accused is not present and there are no circumstances qualifying
under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
As thus correlated, Chimel, Coolidge, and Goldenstein are effective limitation upon
.exceptions to the warrant'requirement, for they serve to restrict the area of permissible
warrantless search and to limit subsequent police activity to that which is relevant to
the purpose justifying initial instrusion.
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that has not, or does not reasonably appear to have, terminated, seizure
will be permitted.
! -An example of this application arose in United States v. Barone 57
where police officers, responding to screams "in the dead of night,"
discovered counterfeit money. A male voice, responding to their de-
mand for entry, inquired as to who was knocking, and was advised that
it was the police. The door was then opened by a woman. After secur-
ing entry, the officers were advised by two female occupants that they
knew nothing of the screams, one of them suggesting that she might
have had a nightmare. At this time, the officers heard the flushing -of a
toilet in the bathroom, out of which emerged a man in hig undershorts.
One, of the officers then entered the bathroom and observed pieces- of
currency floating in the commode.
The Second Circuit sustained the seizure under the emergency
exception, noting that the discovery had been made while the police
were completing their view of the premises in furtherance of the pur-
pose for their entry.58 As the court reasoned:
i Having found nothing amiss in the main room of the apartment,
'it was the duty of the police to enter the bathroom and complete tiheir
view of the premises. They knew that a man must be in the bathroom
as they had been answered by a male voice when they sought admis-
sion. Their investigation of the cause of the screaming would have-
been incomplete without finding out who might be in the bathroom
'and whether anyone there might be in need of aid. The fact that the
appellant had just left the bathroom as they were on the point of en-
tering did not render it unnecessary for, them to view the bathroom.
At this point the sound of the water directed Patrolman Cottle's.
attention to the commode where paper money was floating in plain
yiew. As it is unusual for anyone to flush away good paper money, it
was in the.line of the officer's duty to take the money from the com-
mode to ascertain its nature. His presence at the place was lawful.
-The performance of his duty required him to act as he did.59
IV. INAPPLIcABILITY OF THE DOCTINE
Since the raison d'tre of the emergency exception is the compelling
nel for immediate action by peace officers, the doctrine may not be
- 57. 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U:S. 1004 (1964).'
,58. Id. at 545.
59. Id.; see People v. Clark, 262 Cal. App. 2d471, 476, '68 Cal. Rptr.' 713, 717
(4th Dist. 1968).
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invoked in the absence of "true necessity-that is, an imminent and
substantial threat to life, health, or property . ... ."0 In addition, the
doctrine may not be relied upon where entry is secured after the emer-
gency has terminated.01
In People v. Smith, 2 a Mrs. Kirsch, the owner of a building con-
taining two apartments, one of which was rented by defendant, dis.
covered defendant's young daughter crying outside defendant's flat.
The child told her that she was lonesome and did not want to stay
alone in her mother's apartment. Mrs. Kirsch thereupon took the
child into her own apartment, where she consoled her and gave her
some food. Although the child had told her that she had hurt her
knee, no injury could be detected. After about an hour, Mrs. Kirsch
called the police.
An Officer Brown was dispatched to the scene and questioned the
child. From this, he learned that she had been left alone in her
mother's apartment, had apparently fallen down, and had been taken
in by Mrs. Kirsch. He then decided to ascertain whether the girl's
mother had returned home in the interim, and proceeded to the up-
stairs flat where he knocked on the door, announcing his identifica-
tion. Receiving no response, he directed Mrs. Kirsch to unlock the
door with her key. After entering the flat, Officer Brown called de-
fendant's name, but again received no response. He then proceeded
through the apartment and entered each room. On a nightstand in
60. People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 286, 496 P.2d, 1261, 1263, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893,
895 (1972); see Horack v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 720, 726, 478 P.2d 1, 4, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 569, 572 (1970); Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822). For example, the mere
threat of destruction of evidence will not qualify. To justify entry on this ground, the
destruction must actually be in progress at the time of entry. Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 35 (1970). In spite of the surface logic of this argument, it is submitted that
the requirement of destruction "in progress" is excessive. Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948), required only that destruction or removal be "threatened." Id. at 15;
Vale v. Louisiana,' 399 U.S. 30, 39 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). If the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence will be destroyed or removed while a
warrant is sought, or is in imminent danger of such destruction or removal, this should
be sufficient to justify prompt action. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52
(1951); United States v. Brewer, 343 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Hawaii 1972). It
should be apparent that merely posting the premises will not suffice, for while it might
effectively obstruct removal, it will not prevent destruction. Since time is of the essence
in any emergency, whose probable existence is the only prerequisite for warrantless entry
it would unduly thwart an effective response to insist upon the additional requirement
of actual destruction.
61. Closely allied to this is the situation where an emergency exists at the time
of entry but terminates prior to the search or seizure. E.g., United States v. Goldenstein,
456 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1972).
62. 7 Cal. 3d 282, 496 P.2d 1261, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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the bedroom he found a jar of marijuana, and additional marijuana
on a newspaper lying on the dresser.
In affirming the lower court's suppression of the evidence seized,
the California Supreme Court, noting that the burden rested with the
prosecution to justify the seizure under the emergency doctrine,63
which had been invoked to sustain the seizure, held that the burdei
imposed had not been sustained. Although the court found com-
mendable the officer's concern for the child's safety and welfare, it
recognized that the police must have a corresponding concern for the
interest of the parent in the security and privacy of her home. The
issue, therefore, could not be determined solely by reference to
whether the officer's conduct might have been reasonable under the
circumstances; rather, it would have to be resolved on the basis of
whether the entry could be justified under one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement.6 4
'Proceeding to an evaluation of the facts in terms of the emer-
gency doctrine, the opinion cautioned that "the exception must not be
permitted to swallow the rule: in the absence of a showing of true
necessity-that is, an imminent and substantial threat to life, health,
or property-the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy must pre-
vail."63 The court rejected the argument that a showing of "true neces-
sity" had been made, observing that by the time Officer Brown had
arrived on the scene, the child had been consoled and fed, and did not
appear injured or.upset. Furthermore, Officer Brown had sought entry
to determine the mother's presence and to see if she would require help
in ,caring for her child. This justification had to be rejected because
the, child had told Officer Brown that her mother- was not at home,
which was verified by the lack of response to his knocking on the
apartment door and calling out for the mother after entry had been
gained. Therefore, by the time entry to the bedroom had been secured,
there was no compelling need for his presence. 66
Even "more implausible" was Officer Brown's speculation, after
entering the apartment and receiving no response to his calls, that the
mother "was somehow indisposed and, by that token, in need of 'help' ";
for, there was not a "scintilla of evidence" to support the assumption
that the mother had returned and had become so incapacitated as to
63. Id. at 285, 287, 496 P.2d at 1262, 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 894, 896.
64. Id. at 286, 496 P.2d at 1263, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
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require police assistance. Therefore, Officer Brown had acted upon, a
belief which was "the product not of facts known to or observed by
him, but of his fanciful attempt to rationalize silence into a justifica-
tion for 'his warrantless entry."67 Accordingly, the prosecution had
failed to make a showing of "true necessity," and Officer Brown's entry
into and search of the apartment were unlawful. 8
Although law enforcement officers frequently are required to react
swiftly to emergency situations, thereby being subjected to severe pres-
sures, .they must be careful not to overreact. That is to say, they must
remain alert to the quickly changing aspects of an emergency, so as not
to continue their response after the exigency has ceased to exist. An
interesting example of this aspect of the emergency doctrine excep-
tion arose in the case of Root v. Gauper,69 a federal habeas corpus aris-
ing out of a state conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
The victim, Lonnie Sutton, telephoned an operator saying that
his wife had shot him and requesting that an ambulance be called,
as he was dying.70 The operator connected him with an ambulance
driver, Collier, who in turn called the town marshal, Lindsay. Collier
and two assistants then proceeded to the Sutton home. Meanwhile,
Lindsay called the county sheriff, Marshall, and recounted his conver-
sation with Collier. Lindsay and Marshall then proceeded separately
to the Sutton home. Collier was the first to arrive at the home, en-
tered with his assistants and found Sutton unconscious from a shotgun
wound in the abdomen. They removed the victim to the ambulance
and proceeded to the hospital. On the way, Collier passed Lindsay
and Marshall on their way to the Sutton home and informed them
by radio communication that he had removed Sutton from the house
and was taking him to the hospital.71
Lindsay and Marshall continued on their way to the Sutton home,
with Lindsay arriving first. He did not enter but waited for several
minutes until Marshall arrived. The two officers then entered by way
of an unlocked door, proceeded through the living room to the kitchen,
67. Id. at 287, 496 P.2d at 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 896. The court also rejected
the argument that entry to secure a jacket for the child, which Officer Brown had
testified was one of the reasons for his entry, would qualify under the emergency doc-
trine, commenting that "[mjanifestly it does not rise to the level of 'necessity' as defined
3n the decisions." Id. at 287 n.3, 496 P.2d 1264 n.3, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 n.3.
68. Id. at 286, 287, 496 P.2d 1263, 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 895, 896.
69. 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1971).
70. By the time habeas corpus was brought, Mrs. Sutton had remarried.
71. Sutton was dead on arrival at the hospital.
EMERGENCY DOCTRINE
WJAlib they found a shotgun and shells and took some pictures.72 At'
the'time of entry, the officers had no warrant, there was no one in the
home, and defendant was not arrested until sometime later.
I :.In affirming the grant of habeas corpus, the Eighth Circuit first
rejected the claim that the evidence seized had been in plain view,
noting that the objects were not open to the view of the officers from
outside the house. Thus, plain view alone would not be sufficient to
sustain the seizure.73
The court next proceeded to consider whether the entry qualified
undgr one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. It rejected
the claim that Sutton had consented to the entry, observing that he
did not call the police, never spoke to them, and probably never knew
they were on the way to his residence. Furthermore, any waiver of
rightsguaranteed under the fourth amendment "must be freely and-
intelligently given," a conclusion which could not be warranted by
the' facts of this case.74 This brought the court to the question of the
applicability of the emergency doctrine.
For purposes of the instant case, the court' defined. the doctrine in
these terms:
. [P]olice officers may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render
emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they reasonably be-
lieve to be in distress and in need of that assistance.75
In assessing the doctrine, the court cautioned that two principles must
be kept in mind. First, since the doctrine represents an exception to
the requirement of a warrant, the burden rests with the prosecution to
justify its application. And, second, an "objective standard as to the
reasonableness of the officer's belief must be applied."7 6
Applying these principles to the instant case, the court conceded
that with the benefit of hindsight, it knew that no emergency in fact
existed at the time of entry. In judging the lawfulness of the entry,
however, the court was required to consider whether the officers had a
reasonable basis for their belief that an emergency did exist, and did
acknowledge the "salutary and empirical doctrine of an emergency
or exigency making reasonable a warrantless entry and possibly search
72. All of these items were admitted into evidence over the objection of defendant.





of a home .... ,,77 Still, the record failed to support the application of the
doctrine, and, accordingly, the officers' entry without a warrant was
unjustified under the circumstances.78
The court reasoned that the testimony in the record suggested
that the officers did not believe, and had no reasonable cause to be-
lieve, that an emergency existed at the time of entry, specifically noting
that Marshal Lindsay's waiting several minutes until Sheriff Marshall
arrived before effecting entry was "not consistent with [the action] of
a man who believes that wounded persons might be lying inside the
house awaiting attention." 79 In addition, both officers knew prior to
entering the house that the victim had already been removed from the
residence and was being taken to the hospital. The ambulance operator
and his assistants had not discovered any other wounded victims, and
Sutton had not suggested in his call for assistance that there were any
others wounded. Thus, there was nothing "that would even slightly
suggest that the officers had any reason for believing that there were
any other persons in need of aid."80 Furthermore, since one of the offi-
cers arrived at the scene equipped with a camera which he used upon
entering the residence, it did not appear that the primary purpose for
entry was to render aid and assistance to any victims. Rather, this sug-
gested that the purpose "was to obtain evidence relating to the com-
mission of the crime."8'




81. Id. But cf. United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1972).
